Cowboys by the Numbers: Defense

As we continue to examine 2012 as a primer for what needs to be accomplished heading into training camp of 2013 and beyond, we should follow up our breakdown of the offensive numbers with a thorough checkup of the statistics that the defense was responsible for.

Clearly, this is less relevant when you consider the wholesale adjustments to the defense moving forward.  They spent the offseason changing the coaching staff and the scheme of the defense and asking much of their 3-4 personnel to now simply switch to the 4-3.  Most NFL experts would argue that this is a very unwise endeavor as players are often identified as one or the other on draft day and yet now the Cowboys are asking their entire Front 7 on the defense - who were all drafted because they were tailor-made for the 3-4 scheme to not only learn but perform at a high level on the 4-3.

Much of this is also mitigated by the fact that the Cowboys did run a very multiple and versatile front with Rob Ryan in the last few years and that they have very talented players who should work in any scheme, but still, it is not a sure thing this will work when they have 6 of their projected 7 starters as hold overs from the old scheme.  Only newcomer Justin Durant, the projected SAM linebacker in Monte Kiffin's scheme has every played a snap in a 4-3.  That is a shocking reality of what the Cowboys are about to try to do.

On the other hand, what you are about to see are the statistics that the Cowboys defense has amassed in 2012 with their old scheme.  Now remember, health had a ton to do with another disappointing effort from the defense - so much so that the firing of Rob Ryan doesn't really seem fair based on 2012 performance - but, make no mistake;  we should not be too bothered with the Cowboys trying a new defensive strategy moving forward.

Trouble is, we know from experience that scheme doesn't make the team.  Players do.  Special ones.  And, honestly, I have significant doubts that the Cowboys can be a special defense based on a scheme that requires a team to get pressure with only the front 4 (The Tampa 2 seldom blitzes) and is based on the cognitive skills of safeties to orchestrate the entire secondary.  But, I will let the coaches sort through those issues in a long camp and see where it goes.

In the meantime, let's try our best to sort through those 2012 numbers.  When we did the offense, we found 5 great stats, 5 good stats, and 5 poor stats to analyze.  Unfortunately, finding 5 great stats from the 2012 defense will not be easy, so I am forced to relabel the categories.

Here we go:

5 Good to Great Stats from the Cowboys Defense in 2012

Opponents Quick Strike Drives:  Rated 9th in NFL with 28 drives of 4 plays or less.  NFL Average was 41 drives and Playoff Teams averaged 31 drives where points were scored in 4 plays or fewer.

3rd Down and Long 10 yards+ Conversions: 4th best in NFL with 15.9%.  NFL Average = 20.6%, Playoff Average = 21%

Opponents rushing for 4+ yards:  42% was 7th in NFL.  NFL Average = 43.5%, Playoff Average = 43.9%

Opponents rushes for 50 yards:  Allowed 0 plays ranked 1st.  NFL Average = 1, Playoff Average = 1

Opponents Drives Starting inside the 20:  5th in NFL, 56.  NFL = 48, Playoffs = 48


As you can see, I am really scraping the bottom of our barrel to find 5 stats where the Cowboys rank in the Top 10 in the league.  And let's be honest - none of them really seem to be a major category of excellence.  Rather, they are subcomponents of larger categories.  It is certainly good news that the Cowboys did not give up huge plays very often, but they did give up tons of other things - long drives and big time of possession ground and pounds.

You do have to like that they made teams work hard for rushing yards and did not allow 4 yards a lot relative to the league.  Also, it should be pointed out that the 5th stat I found - opponents' drives starting deep in their own territory is actually a stat that is reflective of strong special teams work - not defensive excellence.

Overall, as you can see, there just wasn't much at all that this defense was really good at.  So, we arrive back at the question of what is the argument for keeping the scheme and the coaching staff the same?


5 League Average Stats from the Cowboys Defense in 2012

Opponents Net Passing Yards Per Game:  230, 19th in NFL.  NFL Average = 231, Playoff Teams Average = 230

Opponents Red Zone Scoring:  54.5 TD%, 18th in the NFL.  NFL Average = 54.1, Playoff Teams = 53.1

Explosive Plays (Plays of 20 yards or more): 67, 22nd in NFL.  NFL = 60, Playoffs = 60

Opponents First Downs:  317, 16th in the NFL.  NFL Average = 318, Playoff Teams = 312

Opponents Time of Possession:  29:27 for 13th in NFL.  NFL Average = 30:00, Playoff Teams 29:23

Here we see that the squad did some things in line with the pack in the NFL.  They weren't killed with yardage through the air and did a reasonable enough job with the clock and limiting the first downs.  However, 67 explosive plays is at the low end of average and there just wasn't enough meat here to help when it mattered most.  They found themselves behind quite a bit early in games and that actually might lead to some misleading numbers through the air as well.  As you will see below, when QB's wanted to move the ball against the Cowboys, they didn't struggle to do so.


5 Very Poor Stats from the Cowboys Defense in 2012

Opponents Negative Plays (in yards):  Cowboys -295, 30th best in NFL.  NFL Average = -370, Playoff Teams -385

Takeaways:  16, which ranked 28th.  NFL Average = 25, Playoffs = 27

Opponents Passer Rating:  94.7, ranked 29th.  NFL Average = 85.6, Playoff Teams Average = 81.8

10 Play Drives Allowed:  32, 28th.  NFL Average = 27, Playoff teams = 28

Opponents Passer Rating vs Blitz:  106.1, 29th.  NFL Average = 83.4, Playoff Teams = 77.8


Holy Cow.

Look at those opponent's passer rating numbers. So, first, just look at all passes.  We have always talked about how 80 is the NFL average and 90+ is an elite QB.  As you can see, the Cowboys defense made their entire schedule to be elite QBs.

Then, with the blitz, they actually got even worse.  They somehow conceded a 106.1 QB rating when they brought pressure.  They also did not turn the ball over (again) and had fewer tackles for loss and sacks than almost anyone in the league.  This is particularly depressing given the monster investment in the cornerback position last offseason.

They just didn't make any plays on defense.  They didn't take the ball away, nor did they make the opponent lose yardage and set up longer plays.

They just didn't do much defensively that you can sink your teeth into.

Moving forward, we look to better health, a new scheme, and better safety play (gulp) to improve upon things.  But, looking at these numbers, you can see the reason some were scratching their heads when the Cowboys did nothing to address the defense of note in the early part of the draft or free agency.  These numbers are the argument for Shariff Floyd or players like that could have added a playmaker to the front 4.

But, they elected to look elsewhere and we will see if they end up regretting that.

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Where (Ware) are the Sacks?

The Cowboys defense has been heavy under the microscope this week after surrendering 400 yards passing, 510 yards in total offense, and 37 points in the home loss to the Giants on the weekend. Rob Ryan's credentials have been examined closer and the defense in general has been targeted for ridicule for their inability to come close to sacking Eli Manning.

The best way to stop an aerial show in the NFL is to apply pressure to the QB. When you cannot get to him in a reasonable amount of time, he is able to then get comfortable, go through his read progressions, and then make an easy throw to his intended target. The QBs at this level are too good to allow that to happen. Yet, again, the Cowboys did just that.

So, over the last several days, I have been asked to break down the pass rush of the Cowboys by the numbers and attempt to figure out how the Giants are doing this, and who on the Cowboys we should be asking much more of.

First, I believe it should all be heading of how good Eli Manning played in this game from an intelligence standpoint. His ability and maturity as a QB has really progressed over the last few seasons, and as critical as I have been of him over the years, I leave this evaluation very impressed by Manning. Rob Ryan threw a ton of things in his direction and was unable to rattle him. In 2008, Eli Manning was sacked 8 times in his final visit to Texas Stadium (the biggest sack performance by a Cowboys defense since 1997) and looked very poor. Since then, he has played 3 games at Dallas and has been sacked once. And I submit that much of it is due to the QB learning how to slow down a pass rush by making sound decisions and getting the ball out quickly. His older brother has been a master of this art for more than a decade, and now it appears Eli is figuring it out, too.

Keep in mind that the Giants had David Diehl (LG) playing Left Tackle against DeMarcus Ware. This was supposed to be a field day for Ware, and it never materialized. It has been suggested in the media that the Cowboys had Ware double-teamed every down. I went back and tried to verify that theory, and here is what I found:

DeMarcus Ware Against New York - 33 pass rush situations:

Lined Up	Single Team	Sacks-Pressure	Double Team	Sacks-Pressure
RT	6	0-2	7	0-1
LT	15	0-2	5	0-0

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As you can see, Ware had 33 chances to get after Eli Manning and ended up with 5 pressures, 0 QB hits, and 0 sacks. How did the Giants do that with David Diehl? Click here to see Ware's 5 pressures.



If you go back and look at those situations where Ware and Diehl squared off, there were almost no occasions when Eli Manning held the ball for any period of time. The ball was out on 3-step drops on quick outs to his WRs or dump downs to a TE. They were not crazy enough to ask Diehl to hold his ground against Ware except on rare occasions. And each of those rare occasions included Eli looking out of the corner of his eye and ready to get rid of the ball.

Then, the Cowboys tried to flip him to the right against the equally underwhelming Kareem McKenzie. McKenzie has been their full-time Right Tackle and ProFootballFocus.com rates him as the 66th tackle in the NFL this year. And yet, the Cowboys were unable to get there on him, either.

Ware did slightly better against McKenzie, but the Giants were very quick to send double teams if they knew they had a pass on that would require any amount of protection.

Here is how Rob Ryan deployed pass rushers, separated by down:

Pass Rushers Against New York - 50 pass rush situations:

Pass Rushers	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Total
3	6	5	1	0	12
4	6	4	5	0	15
5	7	4	4	1	16
6	2	1	3	0	6
7	0	0	1	0	1

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Eli threw 47 passes (and 3 more passes where penalties rendered it "no play) and the Cowboys tried many different ideas. Ryan would try to bring 5, 6, and even 7 and his guys couldn't get home. On 10 occasions, Ryan sent defensive backs. Still no sacks.
And even worse, no real hits on Manning. He was comfortable and the Cowboys couldn't change that comfort no matter what they tried.

There has been plenty said about the Cowboys defense and the deployment of the 11. Still more is bothersome about the apparent confusion on assignments and timeouts are wasted. At this point of the season, there is no question things should be more seamless, however, on the issue of pass rush, I fear that the strategy is not the problem.

When you have a coordinator who is varying his approach, by trying every conceivable idea in every possible scenario, then you are left to wonder about the quality of the players involved. With Ware, you have true quality. His credentials are flawless and his production is off the charts, by any standard. But, it appears he is hurt and the season has taken its toll. He had 12 sacks after 7 games but just 3 sacks in the last 6.

Additionally, if you are the Giants, you will spend all week figuring out how to handle Ware in each and every scenario. It is certainly way easier said than done, but they executed it flawlessly and then were aided with Ware missing 18 of the final 24 snaps. On 2 of the 6 he was back, he committed crucial penalties trying to cheat the snap count.

But, what of the rest of those Dallas defenders? Anthony Spencer was largely facing single-teams (as is often the case) and he couldn't get home. In fact, Victor Butler had one of the two QB hits (Barry Church) in his spells for Ware late in the game. The defensive ends rushed 68 times and never touched the QB once. Jay Ratliff makes plays every game, but interior pass rush is merely a bonus to his arsenal until the Cowboys move him outside (which doesn't appear to be an option on a defense without a true nose tackle).

Bottom line seems to be this: We can continue to blame Rob Ryan for getting the scheme wrong and wonder why DeMarcus Ware doesn't have 4 sacks a game, but the truth is that Ryan tried everything and the Giants only objective is to stop Ware. The Giants gambled that nobody else would bother Eli Manning on the Cowboys defensive front and they were quite right. The Tyron Smith pick was a marvelous one that addressed a real need on the offensive line, but passing on elite rookie defensive ends like JJ Watt really hurt after games like this one. If only the Cowboys had 2 picks at #9.

This is not to say that Rob Ryan is flawless or that Ware does need to get home regardless of what the Giants do. But the truth seems that the Cowboys have many holes on this roster that scheme can only cover up on certain occasions. They lack difference makers that defy Xs and Os, and until they improve that number of difference makers, we might continue to blame the coordinator for not "coaching them up".

This lack of pass rush seems to be a simple matter of the Cowboys needing to improve the pieces on their defense. Many suggested that last summer, but Dallas thought they could get away with some cheap fixes. And now, they see why that might not have been a great decision.

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The Morning After: Giants 37, Cowboys 34 (7-6)

It is certainly difficult to define what constitutes a "good defense" in today's NFL. The days of domination from the defensive side of the ball seem almost theoretical and nostalgic in many regards. The Steel Curtain? Doomsday? Most defenses in this league now routinely surrender 4 Touchdowns in a big game and we just accept that the new rules and the evolution of football dictate that you never shut down offenses anymore - you just try to get a key stop at a key moment.

So, against that backdrop, we examine the post-Wade Phillips defensive era and attempt to provide some context to a Cowboys defense that never excites the fans and media like the torching of Tony Romo and Jason Garrett, but it may provide a little more substance than those exercises anyway.

A fascinating number started circulating last night after the Cowboys gutting 37-34 defeat at the hands of the Giants that provided some insight about how the Cowboys continue to lose games that are in their grasp at the moment of truth. Now that Garrett is 12-9 as coach of the Cowboys, it is interesting to note that 8 of the 9 defeats featured a Dallas 4th Quarter lead (only the Sunday night loss in Philadelphia did not). Many of them, including last night's affair were of the double-digit variety (NYJ, Det, NYG) and all of them threaten to derail the playoff train here in 2011.

Last night's 4th Quarter lead was maximized when Sean Lee picked off a pass and 2 plays later Romo hits a wide-open Dez Bryant from midfield and the Cowboys appeared to have sealed a huge divisional battle with a 34-22 lead with less than 6 minutes to go in the game.

The only way the Cowboys lose the game from there is if they allow 2 Touchdowns on 2 drives and score nothing on their 2 remaining drives to end the game. And, in that exercise, they sadly went 4-4.

Eli Manning, the subject of countless debates and a fair amount of ridicule, absolutely owns this stadium. In 3 trips in, he has left with 3 wins - all requiring his passing to be excellent, and he answered the bell all 3 times. 77-120, 1036 yards and 8 TDs in only 3 trips! If anyone deserves to sign the wall at Cowboys Stadium, it would be Eli. His passer rating of 99.9 in this stadium is enough to concede that he is plenty good to deal with this particular defense regardless of how he does the other weeks of the year. And the most stunning statistic on his ledger? In those 3 trips to the new stadium in Arlington, Eli Manning has been sacked 1 time. Once. DeMarcus Ware got him in 2010. Otherwise, the other 120 times he dropped back to pass, he did so without a whole lot of resistance from the Cowboys pass rush. Being sacked once every 121 pass attempts is certainly not going to get it done.

Down 12, Manning drove his team right down the field. Rob Ryan would rush as few as 3 defenders or as many as 7. Manning seemed fine with either option as he would either enjoy all day to throw or find tasty coverage opportunities down the field. He was impossible to rattle, yet again. And cashed in on a 3rd and 1 when the Cowboys sent 7 as he lofted a pass to Victor Cruz for 23 yards down the right side. Later, the Cowboys sent just 4 and he fired a rocket to Hakeem Nicks for 24 yards down to the 8 yard line. 2 plays later, against a 3 man rush, Manning finds his tight end posting up Sean Lee for a TD and the lead is now 34-29 with a bit over 3 minutes to play.

Now, the Cowboys take the ball at their own 20 yard line and are a play or two away from making sure the Giants never see the ball again. 3rd and 5 from the 25 yard line with 2:25 to play and the Giants only having one timeout left is the game that will properly receive massive amounts of discussion this week. The Cowboys need one play to likely salt away the contest. And Perry Fewell, the Giants defensive coordinator, decides to send everyone. It is a "Cover 0" blitz which is the riskiest coverage in football, and the Cowboys get an opportunity to show why as Miles Austin runs right by Aaron Ross and has a substantial gap with nothing between him and the endzone. Unfortunately, between Romo's throw which was a tad long and Austin's admission that he lost the ball in the lights, the ball falls incomplete, the clock stops, and the punt team comes on to the field. It was simply a play that has to be converted, and if it is, the division title is quite possibly presented to the Cowboys right then and there. It was not, and now the onus will fall on the defense to preserve a 5-point lead with only one chance left for the Giants.

After a poor punt from Mat McBriar, the Cowboys had to protect 58 yards. A field goal would not hurt them, and they simply had to keep the Giants out of the endzone. Again, it is unfortunate to mix a poor pass rush with poor pass coverage, but the Cowboys seemed to have no ability to get a stop.

First, an easy dump down to Jake Ballard turns into a 22-yard gain as Anthony Spencer is trailing the undrafted Tight End down the field. Then, on the 1st play inside the 2-minute warning, an errant snap and a huge loss for New York is nullified as Ware is offsides at exactly the wrong time and for the second time in as many drives. A 2nd and long turns into a 1st and 5. 9 yards to Victor Cruz moves the chains again to at the Dallas 24. On the very next play, a 3 man rush leaves Eli to pick his spot and he drops a beautiful pass into the endzone on Mario Manningham's hands. Manningham had run by Terence Newman and was open for the go-ahead touchdown, but the pass fell off his hands. A drop gave the Cowboys a reprieve.

Trouble was, it was a short-lived reprieve. A near sack is taken off the board because of a defensive holding play. With 1:21 to play, again, the Cowboys cannot cover Ballard as they rush 2 (it appeared Spencer was not aware of his assignment as he covered the same RB (Bradshaw) out of the backfield that Sean Lee was already on) and Manning finds Ballard down to the 1-yard line as he eludes Danny McCray. Two snaps later, Brandon Jacobs is celebrating yet again, a 2-pt conversion is also good, and with :46 left, the Giants take a 37-34 lead.

No timeouts, 80 yards to go, and the Cowboys only had :46 to play. Romo and Miles Austin practically get it all back in 2 plays and have the team down to the Giants 29 yard line with 6 ticks left on the clock. And when Dan Bailey attempts the game-tying kick, Jason Pierre Paul does what he has done all night - dominates the play and blocks the kick. Game Over. Giants win.

A series of unfortunate events again conspire to give the Cowboys another gutting loss. In their 1st 50 years of football, the Cowboys had lost 11 point+ 4th Quarter leads just twice (Nov 28, 1965 at Washington and Oct 23, 1988 at Philadelphia). Then, in 2011, they have done it 3 times. Remarkable and maddening altogether. They are surrendering big leads and doing it quite often when the opponent has to go a long way to get to the end zone.

Very few timely sacks and too many confused and over-run coverage situations. Sometimes, it is Tom Brady or Eli Manning. Other times it has been Rex Grossman and Kevin Kolb who have done the deed late in the game against the Cowboys. They cannot seem to get there without a blitz, and when they do blitz, their coverage is hopelessly compromised.

It would be impossible to find a sole offender for this loss. As is often the case, it is a total team effort that wins and loses in the NFL. Coaches and players all share in the spoils. And again, in a home game against their hated rivals, the Cowboys played well enough to win, but leave with a loss due to too many mistakes at high leverage moments.

It is an episode we are all getting used to seeing in the new stadium. And now, they are backed up against the wall yet again.

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X's and O's Breakdown - The OT Screen

In the words of the late, great Michael Hutchence, "Sometimes you kick, sometimes you get kicked."

Blitzing, and more specifically, fire zone blitzing is a staple of the Rob Ryan defense. We have discussed this at some length in past entries, but usually it is when it works to perfection - such as the study we did when he had Buffalo all confused a few weeks ago.

But, of course, sometimes when you blitz, the other team has figured you out from their film study or they just lucked into a perfect call at a perfect moment. Regardless of how the Cardinals walked the Cowboys right into a trap on the final play of Sunday's game, the truth is on the film for all to see.

Larod Stephens-Howling is known as the "hyphen" in Arizona, and surely is one of those water-bug types that if they can get into the open field, the opponent is going to have a hard time containing him and bringing him down. Another note worth considering is that the Cardinals have a notoriously difficult time executing screen plays. Perhaps that is why the Cowboys felt that this was not going to be a major issue entering the action on Sunday.

The Cardinals are on the 1st Drive of OT, and are facing a 1st and 15 after a penalty. The Cowboys scheme for fire zones vary, but just know that it means the Cowboys are overloading their blitz to one side of the field, while the weakside edge LB will drop into a zone instead of rushing. In this case, that LB is DeMarcus Ware, and the normal genius of such a concept is that the opponent has 2 guys assigned to block #94. So, the premise is simple: Blitz more guys from one side than can be blocked, and rush almost nobody from the other-side which leaves the LT and sometimes LG just standing there with nobody to block.

From the Cardinals standpoint, if they can somehow have a play on that attacks the blitz side, it can go for miles (which it did). If they call the screen to the opposite side, Ware will be standing there and ready to devour the play as he will be unblocked.

Look at the diagram of how the Cowboys defense is to deploy in this situation:



And here is how it looked in presnap from the same view from the coaches film:



The Cowboys are trying to drop 2 LBs (94 and 56) into the shallow zones on either side. Of course, Bradie James is highlighted in green on the diagram (and is standing on the Cardinals logo on the film) because it is rather clear that he busts on this play and gets "caught up in the wash" as he tries to get out wide to the side that the play is about to go. Let's credit #70-Rex Hadnot for getting a very impressive hold on James that keeps Bradie from getting to where he is supposed to go on this play. Also, we should perhaps blame Bradie for attempting to get too cute as he tries to give the impression that he is blitzing for a split second too long. The concept is for Bradie to occupy a blocker with his first step or two, but he has to bail before anyone can get their mitts on him because he has that entire half of the field on the defensive left. It is going to be a long run with no contact, but once Hadnot touches him, this play is doomed. With Sensabaugh and Newman in man coverage, they will have their backs to the play for most of the play, so this is Bradie's play or likely nobody.

We can certainly question the Cowboys thinking their slowest LB could beat the "hyphen" to the edge, but they tried it and the picture below will attest to the fact that the result was ugly:



Sean Lee is a very fast inside LB, but at 4.6, he is no match for a 4.35 guy like Stephens-Howling. Lee diagnoses the play and peels off as fast as he can (and is actually quicker to get there than James), but he will not be able to run him down from behind.

The Cardinals do not even attempt to block Anthony Spencer which is either a horrible decision if Spencer can grab Kevin Kolb or a brilliant one if Kolb can slip past 93 long enough to dump the ball off to hyphen in space. It works like a charm. This demonstrates why mobility for a QB has almost nothing to do with "straight-line" speed and more to do with understanding how a side step can buy you another few tenths of a second.

From the time of the catch, the play is doomed. The Cowboys only real hope is that Terence Newman can get around Andre Roberts to bring down Stephens-Howling near the 45. Once Newman is dealt with quite easily, it becomes a comedy of missed tackles and less-than-inspired efforts to bring him down inside the 20 which speaks to the knowledge that the game is already lost once the play goes deep inside FG range.

Is it a horrible call from Rob Ryan? This is the nature of all of football. Call a blitz on 1st Down when few would expect it is a great idea when it works (a sack is a drive ender if the Cardinals are looking at a 2nd and 22)- and a horrible plan when it fails. Asking Bradie James to get to the flank in time against Stephens-Howling sounds like a very poor plan, unless you are playing the odds that the Cardinals hadn't used him hardly all day long. One does wonder how a speedy inside LB like Bruce Carter would do in the same situation, but that clearly isn't close to happening as Carter has not exactly forced his way onto the field yet (11 snaps against Seattle, 13 against Buffalo, 0 at Washington, 0 vs Miami, 0 at Arizona).

So, perfect call against your blitz or reckless play call from Rob Ryan? It is a results-based business, so in this case, Ryan was caught with his hand in the cookie jar and his players were unable to bail him out.

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X's and O's Breakdown - Fire Zone Blitzing

Rob Ryan has a bit of a reputation for having a high-risk, high-reward defense. There are many versions of the 3-4 defense and to compare and contrast Wade Phillips' 3-4 to Rob Ryan's 3-4 would take quite a while. They utilize the same personnel in the base defense, but there are an infinite number of ways to apply that defense. And make no mistake, Ryan does it differently than Phillips.

The object of the game for the defense is 2-fold. 1) don't allow points (this is rather obvious) and 2) to cause game-changing plays (takeaways, sacks, and the occasional big hit). Both are important and just about all championship caliber defenses can excel in both categories.

As we look at the first year under Rob Ryan (and maybe the only year), we see the Cowboys are allowing 20.2 points per game rather than the 27.3 they allowed in 2010. We also see that after years of not generating takeaways, the Cowboys already have 19 which rank them only 2 takeaways short of the league lead. In 2008 and 2009, the Cowboys had but 22 and 21 takeaways for the entire season.

Is the Cowboys defense elite? That would be a stretch given the clinic they were taught in Philadelphia a few weeks back. But the defense has more takeaways, more sacks, fewer explosives against, and are allowing fewer points than last year's edition. Of course, last year's defense was so bad that improvement was imperative. But, given much of the same personnel, Rob Ryan has put his stamp on how things are done around here. And as each week grows into the next, the confidence of the unit seems to grow and they pull more tricks out of their sleeves.

There may be a misperception about how Rob's blitzes work. In the 1970's and 1980's, blitzes were simply an effort to throw more numbers at an offense than they could block. If they are using 6 to protect, you send 7. They move to 7, you send 8. This became impractical when QBs started feasting on an exposed secondary. When both safeties would blitz, then the QB and WR knew that they had to beat just one man - the corner in front of them - and they were off to the races. It became more and more routine to find the hot route and chase the blitz away. And that is when coaches had to go back to the drawing board.

The evolution has brought us to the aggressive 3-4's of today's game. What Dick LeBeau in Pittsburgh, Dom Capers in Green Bay, and Rex Ryan in New York all employ are variations of 3-4's based in deception utilizing fire zone blitz concepts and techniques.

What this generally means is that they will seldom ever bring more than 5 pass rushers on a given play (On Sunday, Rob Ryan sent 6 rushers twice in 37 pass situations), but you will never fully grasp which 4 or 5 defenders are coming until the play is under way.
Bringing 5 on a blitz looks chaotic, and yet, it allows 6 players behind it to retreat into a relatively sound 3-3 zone defense.

Pass Rushers Against Buffalo - 37 pass rush situations:

Pass Rushers	Times
3	6
4	20
5	9
6	2

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Clearly, these principles present the best of both worlds when it is run properly - pass rush effectiveness without giving up coverage behind it.

Wade Phillips is no slouch himself when it comes to designing defenses. However, Wade had no interest in the last couple years engaging in the fire zones like those other 3-4s. Also, Wade Phillips would almost never blitz a defensive back. We see every Sunday that some of the most successful blitz situations in the NFL culminate in a QB being blindsided by a untouched safety or cornerback. But, Wade - for reasons that can only be speculated upon - would almost never send a DB as coach of the Cowboys.

In 2008, the Cowboys blitzed a DB (according to our friends at www.profootballfocus.com) just 37 of 602 pass situations (6%). In 2009, it was 29 occasions on 707 pass plays (4%). And in 2010, the Cowboys defense actually did more when Phillips was fired, but for the year, 50 DB blitzes in 584 pass plays (8%).

But, we know that those other pressure defenses believe in making the QB believe that with 11 defenders, you better believe that at some point, they are going to send every single one of them at you. Not often, but often enough that they think when the time is right they will spring the ambush and change the game.

In 2011, the Cowboys have blitzed defensive backs 81 times in 335 pass plays. 24%! In other words, Ryan has blitzed more DBs in 9 games than the Cowboys had in the previous 2 seasons combined. That is enough to confuse and confound when applied properly. Now, let's look at how they are doing it.



Here is the 3rd snap for Buffalo in Sunday's game. Bills bring out shotgun with 4 WRs and force the Cowboys into a dime package with 6 DBs. It is 3rd and 14, and the numbers we tabulate indicate Ryan doesn't like to blitz much on 3rd and long. Rather, he enjoys playing coverage and blitzing when you least suspect it.

But here, the Cowboys are bringing a fire-zone from Ryan Fitzpatrick's blindside. Look at the picture at presnap and try to decide which 5 Cowboys are about to rush. I don't think that is an easy task.

If you guessed 2 corners, the LDE, NT, and Ware, you win. Ware - playing inside LB, Walker and Scandrick - the two corners, and Hatcher and Ratliff from the DL. Meanwhile Spencer, who sure looks like he is lined up over RT - ready to rush - drops out of the play into the hook/curl area on the right. Sean Lee must go all the way across the field to get the hook/curl on the left in that zone. Abe Elam takes shallow middle and now you see the 3-3 alignment behind the blitz. Check the diagram below.



Now for the blitz. When considering pass protection, offenses try to cut the pass rush in half. In fact, the center and running back are always in communication to make sure they understand each other about which is going to help which side. If the center is going right to help the RG, then the RB must pick up from the left. But, in presnap, the RT and RB are looking at Elam and Spencer as possible blitz targets. This deception is what makes it work. They are occupied until the snap, and then when their men don't rush, they are too late to redeploy elsewhere in time.

And thus is the concept of the fire zone blitz. The defense is not trying to outnumber you. They are trying to get you to pick up the wrong men. 5 can beat 6 if the 6 don't know which 5 are coming until it is too late. Then, in the blink of an eye, your QB is getting blindsided. Check the video of play #1 here.



You can really see the problems that are caused for Bills' LT 67-Andy Levitre as he is trying to block 3 guys at the same time. Finally, Walker goes by him and almost caused another takeaway. Meanwhile, the RT 79-Erik Pears has nobody to block so he joins the C and RG in blocking the same guy, Ratliff.

Let's look at another snap with a similar concept. 3rd Quarter, 2nd Down and 8 to go.



This time, you can tell that Fitzpatrick is nervous about what Ryan is doing in presnap. Trying to sort through so many possible blitzers to find the right combination is not fun - especially when you go to 4 WR and "scat" protection. Scat protection means simply 5-man protection, no help from RB or TE. But, the way the Cowboys align is causing great distress to the presnap reads for the Bills.

To understand why, look at 94-Ware and 90-Ratliff. Ratliff is over the center again and the RG was likely assigned to help. With Ware out wide the RT is locked on one of the most ferocious pass rushers in the sport. So, where does that leave 25-Frank Walker who is standing between them? What an odd place for a corner. The Bills are trying to sort this out. Then the snap happens and Walker and Ware are not rushing at all. Instead, another 4 man blitz against 3 men on the left side. Hatcher, Ratliff, Spencer, all occupy the OL, so around the corner again comes an untouched DB, Orlando Scandrick.

Watch video of play #2 by clicking here.


Again, neither play changed this game. But, it shows what can happen and it shows the opponent what they better be thinking about before they line up against the Cowboys. Corners, safeties, and linebackers. Anyone on the field might be blitzing.

They had better be ready.

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