Decoding Garrett - Week 16 - Data - At New York

The Cowboys seasons have ended in somewhat similar fashion over the last several years. Admittedly, the records have been different and the details do vary some, but it seems that invariably, when the season does end, it ends in a way that is reminiscent
of Cowboys' failures past.

Since Tony Romo's bobbled hold in Seattle, each subsequent season ender was decided with the Cowboys offense looking at its lineman as a major culprit and what should be a major objective moving forward.

In 2007, it was an offensive line that did not hold up in the 4th Quarter against a strong Giants' front. Most damaging indictment was on the game's final play that the go-to receiver, Jason Witten, was forced to stay in and help block so Tony Romo was not sacked to end the season. In the aftermath, concerns of the offensive line were everywhere.

In 2008, losing 3 out of 4 in the month of December ended a tumultuous year. Down the stretch, with losses in Pittsburgh, at home against Baltimore, and at Philadelphia, the line crumbled again. Before December, the Cowboys allowed the 8th fewest sacks in the league. But after December 1, no team in the NFL allowed more sacks than the Cowboys did (13). The concerns with the offensive line where there for all to see.

IN 2009, the Cowboys had a wonderful year along the offensive line. Without question, it was the finest year of pass protection and run production the organization has had in the last decade. All went according to plan until they advanced to play the strong front of the Minnesota Vikings at the Metrodome in the divisional round of the playoffs. 6 sacks later, the Cowboys were bruised, beaten, and eliminated. Anyone who watched that game would be hard pressed to suggest the Cowboys line did their job very well.

In 2010, the breakdown happened earlier in the season, with Tennessee sacking Romo 6 times as once again Marc Colombo and Leonard Davis looked old and slow. 2 weeks later, Romo was lost for the season as the Giants were able to slam him to the turn and break his collarbone. Any doubt about the OL's pass protection ability was difficult to confirm with sack totals, because they only allowed 31 the whole season. But, observers started to see that Jason Garrett was continuing to alter these totals with play calling. Short passes, many behind the line of scrimmage, were his best remedy for pass protection breakdowns. If Romo (or his healthy QB) could get rid of the ball before his OL was beaten, they could keep any stretchers from being needed.

And in 2011, with the season on the line, the season collapsed again in December. The team was 7-4 entering the final month of the year and had allowed only 20 sacks in 11 games. At times, it was preventive play calling and at other times, the offensive line started to show that it was getting better with many new, young components. Tyron Smith, Phil Costa, and Bill Nagy were now starters and team put an incredible amount of faith and belief in their ability to protect and form holes for the running game.

But, then came December, where only the Chicago Bears allowed more sacks to their QBs than the Cowboys allowed. 19 sacks in 5 games (and countless others escaped by Romo), and a running game that plummeted to 25th in the league due to an injury to DeMarco Murray and the line unable to get a push against the tough lines in New York and Arizona.

It is the same old situation at the moment of truth. An offensive line that does not protect and serve, but rather an offensive line that prevents the offense from having enough time and space to get the ball to its difference makers. One shudders to think what Troy Aikman and Emmitt Smith would have been able to accomplish if Tony Romo's offensive lines were to replace the fabulous lines of the 1990s.

Nowhere is this more apparent than against familiar divisional foes, especially on the road. In 8 home games, the Cowboys allowed 11 sacks. In 8 road games, they suffered 28. And now that we established the problems in December and the problems on the road, we understand how tough it is going to be when they have to play a December game on the road against the New York Giants.

A few weeks ago, we discussed at great length the "game plan for road games" that Jason Garrett has used. I encourage you to review that piece that originally ran after the game at Arizona. Since 2008, when the Cowboys face a road test against an opponent with a notable defensive front, Garrett enters the game with very little faith in his line (for obvious reasons). He then attempts to protect them by calling almost no run plays (save for shotgun runs on 3rd and long to get his punter some space) and no pass plays that require time and protection. It is a series of quick outs, screens, dump downs, and a passing offense that cannot stretch the field.

This actually can work, but only if the team stays on schedule. If it ever gets into a 2nd or 3rd and long (which will happen often), then he has no choice but to ask his protection to hold up so that the Cowboys can move the chains. This risks his QB to taking another beating and invites blitzes and stunts to expose the line yet again. The Cowboys switch to almost exclusively shotgun, and the defense can then replace its run stoppers with more cover guys and Romo's job gets even more difficult.

Garrett tried 5 traditional runs on Sunday from under center in the entire game. Five. And then, because the score had tilted against him at 14-0, the only other run play from under center tried for the remaining 3 quarters was the horrible QB sneak in the 4th Quarter that never had a chance. Basically, the Cowboys OL never fired forward the entire night. They backed up in retreat as they attempted to keep the crumbling pocket alive for another second.

So, given the cycle of repetition we are seeing year after year, where the offense can go as far as the line can take them, we can debate whether Garrett should show more faith in his offensive line or if he is just doing what should be done with his play calling. But, what can't be argued (I wouldn't think) is that the Cowboys must continue to make the OL its top priority. They are wasting the prime of a difficult to find QB who can play at a very high level by not providing him the protection in key moments like many of the successful QBs in this league enjoy.

Put another way, it appears you can have all of the skill players in the world assembled, but unless you can figure out a way to protect your QB, it won't matter.

Data from Week 16 at New York

Run-Pass	15-44
1st Down Run-Pass	7-21
2nd Down Avg Distance to Go	7.88
2nd Down Run-Pass	5-13
3rd Down Avg Distance to Go	7.58
3rd Down Run-Pass	2-10
3rd Down Conversions	4-12, 33%

HTML Tables

From a play calling standpoint, despite wanting balance in the offense of run/pass, it is clear that in similar road settings (at New England, at Philadelphia, at Arizona, at New York) the Cowboys abandon the run in the 1st Quarter. Regardless of score, there is no reason a team cannot stick to their game plan better unless they realize they have no chance to run the ball in running situations.

Drive Starters - 1st play of each drive can often reveal the intent of a coach to establish his game plan.

Wk 1-At New York Jets: 13 Drives - 5 Run/8 Pass
Wk 2-At San Francisco: 10 Drives - 4 Run/6 Pass
Wk 3-Washington: 11 Drives - 5 Run/6 Pass
Wk 4-Detroit: 14 Drives - 7 Run/7 Pass
Wk 5-At New England: 11 Drives - 4 Run/7 Pass
Wk 6-St Louis: 11 Drives - 8 Run/3 Pass
Wk 7-At Philadelphia - 9 Drives - 2 Run/7 Pass
Wk 8-Seattle - 11 Drives - 4 Run/7 Pass
Wk 9-Buffalo - 10 Drives - 7 Run/3 Pass
Wk 10-At Washington - 14 Drives - 4 Run/10 Pass
Wk 11-Miami - 11 Drives - 5 Run/6 Pass
Wk 12-At Arizona - 11 Drives - 3 Run/8 Pass
Wk 13-New York - 12 Drives - 7 Run/5 Pass
Wk 14-At Tampa - 10 Drives - 5 Run/5 Pass
Wk 15-Philadelphia - 11 Drives - 5 Run/6 Pass
Wk 16-At New York - 12 Drives - 4 Run/8 Pass
Total: 181 Drives - 79 Run/102 Pass 44% Run


Here is the breakdown by groupings:

Before you study the data below, I would recommend that if the numbers for the groupings are unfamiliar, that you spend some time reading a more expanded definition of the Personnel Groupings here.

Totals by Personnel Groups:

Package	Plays Run	Yards	Run	Pass
11	1	0	1-0	0-0
12	4	13	1-1	3-12
13	0	0	0-0	0-0
21	3	2	1--1	2-3
22	3	9	3-9	0-0
23	0	0	0-0	0-0
S01	0	0	0-0	0-0
S02	2	4	0-0	2-4
S11	45	259	9-44	36-215
S12	1	8	0-0	1-8
Knee	0	0	0-0	0-0
Totals	59	295	15-53	44-242

Table Tutorial

Totals by Personnel Groups on 3rd/4th Down:

Package	Plays	Yards	Run	Pass	FD/TD
11	1	0	1-0	0-0	0/0
12	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
13	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
21	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
22	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
23	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
S01	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
S02	1	-8	0-0	1--8	0/0
S11	11	38	2-14	9-24	4/0
S12	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
Totals	13	30	3-14	10-16	4/0

Table Tutorial

Just look at how bad the offense was on 3rd Down when the pass protection is most vital. 10 passes for a total of 16 yards is horrendous. If you want one explanation, it is because Tony Romo knows he will not have a chance to go through his reads without a large defensive end trying to put him in the hospital. His eye level is down making sure he doesn't get blindsided instead of seeing his receivers down field. And it is tough to blame him too much.

SHOTGUN SNAPS-

Shotgun snaps are fine on 3rd Down and in the 2 minute drill. But, we track this stat from week to week to make sure the Cowboys aren't getting too lazy in using it. They are not efficient enough to run it as their base, and with a 15%/85% run/pass split across the league, there is no way the defense respects your running game.

Wk 1 - NYJ: 24/66
Wk 2 - SF: 32/66
Wk 3 - Wash: 27/62
Wk 4 - Det: 29/75
Wk 5 - NE 31/67
Wk 6 - StL 10/60
Wk 7 - Phi 39/49
Wk 8 - Sea 19/59
Wk 9 - Buf 15/61
Wk 10-Was 24/73
Wk 11-Mia 25/58
Wk 12-Arz 29/67
Wk 13-NYG 28/58
Wk 14-TB 26/67
Wk 15-Phi 39/66
Wk 16-NYG 48/59

Total - 445/1012 43.9%


As you can see, the Cowboys were as one dimensional as it gets. Lots of shotgun is never good for a team. It usually says it is the final chance and they are well behind in the game. Last time the Cowboys ran so much shotgun? When Jacksonville crushed them in 2010.

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Next week, we will publish the season totals and look at things from a larger perspective for the 2011 campaign.

And please email me at Sturm1310@aol.com if you have questions that I may clarify in an upcoming email blog.

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X's and O's Breakdown - The Twist Stunt

According to NFL Statistics, the Dallas Cowboys are right about at the league average when it comes to preventing sacks. This season, the Cowboys have allowed 33 sacks on their QB, with the league average being 35 for the season. As a point of reference, Buffalo and Tennessee lead the league with just 21 sacks against, and St Louis and Arizona are the league worst, allowing their poor QBs to be sacked 52 times each. It has not been fun to be Sam Bradford.

But, there are so many reasons to ignore this statistic as a rule. I hear people all the time trying to suggest the Cowboys are a strong team in pass protection because they don't allow that many sacks. But that doesn't account for many items that cause sacks allowed to be misleading.

Such as, how many sacks is the QB saving with his mobility? How many 3 and 5 step drops are being called by offensive coordinator because he doesn't trust protection? How many RBs and TEs are staying in to help out OL because of fear of the OL's ability to be able to hold the pocket?

None of these considerations are found when we discuss sack totals, but all of them affect the number. If the object of the game is to prevent sacks, it would be easy for a coach to avoid almost all of them. But, the object of the game is to score as many points as possible, and that can usually only be done by risking your QB on occasion. Max protection can often keep your QB clean, but it dramatically reduces the chances for your receivers to cause coverage issues for the defense. Only 2 players in route? Way to easy to bracket with corners and safeties over the top. A truly difficult offense to handle has 4-5 targets out in route on most passing plays. They spread you out, invite a blitz, and then burn you quickly.

Which brings us to our breakdown from the Philadelphia game - a play that on the official game sheet reads like this, "(9:57) (Shotgun) T.Romo pass incomplete short middle to M.Austin [J.Babin]. Pass incomplete on crossing pattern; Hughes closest defender at the Philadelphia 45."

That's right. What could have been the most pivotal play of the season for the Dallas Cowboys has almost no statistical bearing whatsoever.

It reminds you of this play from 2010: "(12:20) T.Romo pass short left to M.Austin to NYG 29 for 14 yards (T.Thomas) [M.Boley]. DAL-T.Romo was injured during the play. His return is Questionable. Pass complete on comeback curl.

That, of course, was the play where Tony Romo was lost for the year due to Chris Gronkowski not reading and picking up a blitz from Michael Boley. Romo's collarbone was broken, and 2010 was completely gone down the tubes.

This demonstrates 2 important truths. 1) Sacks only cover a fraction of pass protection and 2) The Season can be rocked from its foundation on any play of the season if you get your QB hit too hard.



Click Here to see full video of this play.

Let's analyze this play from the perspective of the Philadelphia Eagles. First, they realize that Sammy Morris is in charge of blitz pickup on 3rd Downs. This is a far cry from Felix Jones or DeMarco Murray. They have been in Dallas since training camp and getting familiar with all of Dallas' protection concepts since installation. Morris was signed off the street a few weeks ago, and while most running plays are easy for him to comprehend, complex protection situations will be the last to come along.

Next, the Eagles surely have studied how Arizona sacked Tony Romo 5 times. Those sacks came off multiple attacks of Phil Costa and the interior of the Dallas OL. Not necessarily his anchor issues (which are substantial), but rather his awareness and ability to see something in pre-snap, but then adjust at the last second to an ambush blitz. Stunts and blitzes are starting to overwhelm him, and the Eagles are smart enough to see that trend and mimic it.

So, look at the picture at the top of the blog. The Eagles are showing Jason Babin-93 out wide of Tyron Smith at RT again in his "wide 9" technique. The possibilities of them taking a player this wide and stunting him all the way to the opposite "A" gap (between Costa and LG Holland) seems so remote and ridiculous that I highly doubt the Cowboys even considered it a concern.

Then, look at the safety 26-Jarrett start deep and then creep to the outside of Babin. This will be the focus of Sammy Morris on blitz pick up, and will occupy all of his attention. Thus, now the Eagles have a 3 on 3 situation. They will take 50-Matthews (MLB) and 98-Patterson (DT) and send them both away from center. Matthews will attack the RG (Kosier) and Patterson will attack the RT (Smith). This occupies them and leaves Babin to swing all the way around their backs. But, he won't dive inside Costa to his right shoulder, because Costa is already headed that way to get Matthews.

Instead, as the 2nd picture clearly reveals, Babin shows his insane athleticism and heads to the left side of Costa. Costa must hear Kosier or Smith call out this stunt and then slide over to Babin. If it is covered correctly, Costa slides to Babin, Kosier slides to Matthews, and Smith still has Patterson.

That same picture shows Kosier is falling backwards, so if Costa does leave Matthews, then Casey will get to Romo, but it won't be with as much speed or size as Babin. Costa has to leave his guy and get the unblocked sack leader. It is highly possible the blame falls to Smith for not calling out what is going on, but you can understand at the NFL game, audio alerts are certainly not fool-proof in loud stadiums.

And now, below, you see the horrible result. How Romo stays relatively healthy after this hit is truly a smile from the football gods.



And there you see the issues involved with pass protection. You tip your cap to the Eagles for finding a concept that gets a free run on Romo, and you try to make sure it doesn't happen again. Trouble is, a few plays later, with McGee in the game, a similar stunt from Trent Cole runs right by Costa and hits McGee in the mouth, too. Teams are attacking the middle with great regularity now that they see it is a tough spot for the Cowboys to defend.

And today, in a dark room, the Giants are looking at this play and taking careful notes.

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Decoding Garrett - Week 12 - Data - At Arizona

In the great basketball movie, "Hoosiers", Coach Norman Dale walked his team of under-dogs into the gigantic field house where the state tournament was going to be held and showed his team how everything might seem bigger, but it is all the same. He measured the height of the basket (10 feet) and the distance to the free throw line (15 feet). Same as in the gym where they play back in Hickory.

I wonder if Jason Garrett has ever seen Hoosiers. Because when you watch his offense over the course of many years now, or in particular his team since he has taken over as coach, you can see a very distinct difference in the way his team operates offensively when they leave their home stadium.

Now, we should concede that the list of home opponents (Washington, Detroit, St Louis, Seattle, Buffalo, and Miami) seems to be a substantial downgrade from the road opponents (New York Jets, San Francisco, New England, Philadelphia, Washington and Arizona) to explain some variations in performance. However, the differences between the home and road game plans are so drastic and frankly, predictable, that one certainly has room to wonder if the Cowboys attempt to call two different game plans.

At home, they are aggressive and determined. Run and pass splits are nearly identical. They often make their opponents choose their poison and then serve it up on a platter. It may not always work, but they are adventurous and creative in the way they go about their business. They will try even trick plays, they will pass when you think run, they will pound the ball until you can stop it, and they have a swagger.

On the road, they are timid. They are easily chased off their objectives. They abandon the run early and often. They put everything on their QB and his ability to make lemonade out of lemons. They seem to call plays in an effort to prevent disasters rather than to attack. They send a message to the troops that they are not sure if they can score points, so they often don't.

And this pattern has been in place for quite a while. Nobody is saying they never bring their home personality on the road, because they do. And sometimes, their road personality shows up in Arlington, too. But, if you look at the large sample under the play-calling of Jason Garrett, it is clear that there is a split in objectives and intentions between home games and road games.

Let's look at some evidence.

The best way a play caller can send a message to his opponent is by calling plays on 1st Down. It establishes the tone and attitude of the offense and declares to the opponent what is planned for the day.

But, when the Cowboys have been at home this season, on 1st and 10, the Cowboys have run 177 plays. The splits for those 177 snaps to start a play sequence has been 98 runs and 79 passes. The 55%/45% split demonstrates proper balance for a balanced offense. On 1st Down, you run the ball more because on 3rd Down, you almost never run. But as a whole, 55% runs on 1st Down will mean that your overall balance will be intact.

Conversely, when the Cowboys have played their 6 games on the road, they have had 172 1st and 10 situations. The splits on 1st Down when they have been on the road has seen just 68 runs and 104 passes. This 39%/61% split on 1st and 10 sets the Cowboys up for days where they never get anything done on the ground and become a 1-dimensional team. We have even heard explanations about the opponent putting an eighth man in the box to encourage the Cowboys to start slinging the ball around the yard.

Given that almost all of the road games have been very tight games and given that we are only looking at 1st and 10, we must ask why the Cowboys can be 55% run at home and 39% run on the road? We understand throwing the ball on 3rd and 12, but why does this team not allow its running game to attempt to find its footing on the road?

And what are the by-products of becoming 1-dimensional and ultra predictable on the road? Let's look at how teams counter the Cowboys when they have chased Dallas out of running plays. The Dallas Cowboys allow the fewest sacks in the NFL in home games. In 203 pass plays at home, Tony Romo has been sacked 5 times or once every 40.6 pass plays.

On the road, the Cowboys have allowed 20 sacks in 6 games (5th worst in the NFL). These 20 sacks have occurred over 254 pass plays for an average of 1 sack every 12.7 pass plays. It seems rather clear that not having balance is making the Cowboys far easier to blitz. And the blitzing beats up your QB and over-runs your offensive line.

Here is evidence that Romo might be playing his best football of his career. In those 6 road games where he has been under siege throughout the game because of the pass rush, Romo has easily the best passer rating of any QB in the league who is getting sacked 3 times a game or more on the road. His rating of 94.1 on the road this season while being sacked so often is off the charts. Only Alex Smith in San Francisco is coming close with a rating of 85.9. You just wonder what they would do if the Cowboys would bring their home game plan on the road with them.

Run the ball, take the steam out of the pass rush. Don't run the ball, invite the blitz. This is very basic football, but the Cowboys consistently do this to themselves on the road. In fact, if you take Sunday's game plan and compare it with the exact game plan from the New England game, you will find that they treated their play calling in the exact same way. The similarities are uncanny.

Data from Week 12 at Arizona

Run-Pass	20-47
1st Down Run-Pass	9-21
2nd Down Avg Distance to Go	8.44
2nd Down Run-Pass	9-16
3rd Down Avg Distance to Go	6.66
3rd Down Run-Pass	2-10
3rd Down Conversions	4-12, 33%

HTML Tables

Drive Starters - 1st play of each drive can often reveal the intent of a coach to establish his game plan.

Notice that 3 1st Down runs are the lowest of the season. The Cowboys started their first 2 drives on Sunday with runs (both 7 yard gains) and then on the final 9 drives, they passed on 1st down 8 times. It is rather befuddling.

Wk 1-At New York Jets: 13 Drives - 5 Run/8 Pass
Wk 2-At San Francisco: 10 Drives - 4 Run/6 Pass
Wk 3-Washington: 11 Drives - 5 Run/6 Pass
Wk 4-Detroit: 14 Drives - 7 Run/7 Pass
Wk 5-At New England: 11 Drives - 4 Run/7 Pass
Wk 6-St Louis: 11 Drives - 8 Run/3 Pass
Wk 7-At Philadelphia - 9 Drives - 2 Run/7 Pass
Wk 8-Seattle - 11 Drives - 4 Run/7 Pass
Wk 9-Buffalo - 10 Drives - 7 Run/3 Pass
Wk 10-At Washington - 14 Drives - 4 Run/10 Pass
Wk 11-Miami - 11 Drives - 5 Run/6 Pass
Wk 12-At Arizona - 11 Drives - 3 Run/8 Pass
Total: 136 Drives - 58 Run/78 Pass 42% Run


Here is the breakdown by groupings:

Before you study the data below, I would recommend that if the numbers for the groupings are unfamiliar, that you spend some time reading a more expanded definition of the Personnel Groupings here.

Here, please note the inefficiency of "S12" where they run their shotgun package with 2 TEs. it is clearly not working well, especially on 3rd down where the Cardinals blitzed the house when the Cowboys tried to put Phillips on the field.

Totals by Personnel Groups:

Package	Plays Run	Yards	Run	Pass
11	1	2	1-2	0-0
12	19	124	5-20	14-104
13	7	16	4-7	3-9
21	3	38	2-14	1-24
22	8	41	6-18	2-23
23	0	0	0-0	0-0
S01	0	0	0-0	0-0
S02	3	42	0-0	3-42
S11	19	70	1-3	18-67
S12	7	-6	1-8	6--14
Knee	0	0	0-0	0-0
Totals	67	327	20-72	47-255

Table Tutorial

Totals by Personnel Groups on 3rd/4th Down:

Package	Plays	Yards	Run	Pass	FD/TD
11	1	2	1-2	0-0	1/0
12	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
13	1	0	0-0	1-0	0/0
21	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
22	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
23	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
S01	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
S02	2	15	0-0	2-15	1/0
S11	5	7	1-3	4-4	2/0
S12	3	-7	0-0	3--7	0/0
Totals	12	17	2-5	10-12	4/0

Table Tutorial

Shotgun snaps are fine on 3rd Down and in the 2 minute drill. But, we track this stat from week to week to make sure the Cowboys aren't getting too lazy in using it. They are not efficient enough to run it as their base, and with a 15%/85% run/pass split across the league, there is no way the defense respects your running game.

Again, the similarities to the numbers from the timid game plan in New England is just amazing. They tried for the exact same game even though they were playing a 4-7 Arizona team.

SHOTGUN SNAPS-

Wk 1 - NYJ: 24/66
Wk 2 - SF: 32/66
Wk 3 - Wash: 27/62
Wk 4 - Det: 29/75
Wk 5 - NE 31/67
Wk 6 - StL 10/60
Wk 7 - Phi 39/49
Wk 8 - Sea 19/59
Wk 9 - Buf 15/61
Wk 10-Was 24/73
Wk 11-Mia 25/58
Wk 12-Arz 29/67

Total - 304/762 39.9%


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Bottom line, the Cowboys have to prove that they are a threat on the road to make you pay. But, instead, they constantly enter the game seemingly content to play for a 16-13 game. They don't wish to change their ways, and now opponents have figured it out. It is time for the Cowboys to self-scout and realize what they are becoming on the road. A very predictable and an easy team to defend.

And please email me at Sturm1310@aol.com if you have questions that I may clarify in an upcoming email blog.

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Breaking Down A Great Drive

Tony Romo is on a tremendous roll right now, playing some of the best football of his career over the last few weeks. It sure seemed that if you combine his mastery of the 4th Quarter against Washington to what we saw in the 2nd half against Miami, there is reason to believe that Romo is rounding into a form that makes him a big threat in the NFC to put the Cowboys in a great spot. The sequence we want to review from the Miami game is all about Romo making play after play at a crucial moment of the contest.

Let's review the 9th Drive of the game here today. At this point, the Cowboys are trailing, have been out-gained badly, have lost momentum, and need to make a statement before this must-win game gets totally away from them. They have barely touched the ball in the 3rd Quarter and now take the ball after the Dolphins have taken a 16-10 lead.



Play #1: 1/10/23 - (3:48) T.Romo pass short left to M.Bennett to DAL 31 for 8 yards (K.Burnett). Pass complete on a "Crossing Pattern."

Cowboys start in "12" personnel. This is worth noting because they never leave "12" the entire rest of the quarter. This is an odd and enlightening idea for Jason Garrett. Seldom does he stay in the same personnel package for any extended period of time, but this time he saw they were getting in a rhythm and stayed with it. 1st Down and the Cowboys have the two tight ends lined up off each tackle in a double wing look. Dolphins are in a man-under coverage so Romo picks out Martellus Bennett going across the field with a LB - Kevin Burnett - in a trail position. Bennett has a step but is tripped up after 8 by a nice ankle tackle.

Non Play: 2/2/31 - (3:08) PENALTY on DAL-D.Free, False Start, 5 yards, enforced at DAL 31 - No Play.

Play #2: 2/7/26 - (2:43) (Shotgun) Romo pass short right to Witten to DAL 35 for 9 yards (K. Burnett)(R.Starks)

This play goes poorly because Kyle Kosier is getting trucked into the backfield by Randy Starks. This causes Romo to throw the ball into a bad area and if there is a moment he would like back, it would have to be this. Vontae Davis very likely should have picked off this pass to Witten, but the jump ball falls into the hands of the trusty Tight End after Romo held the ball for nearly 4 seconds (3.9). Protection and the QB just about ended the drive right here, but instead the Cowboys move the chains and get a fresh set of downs after Romo made a play under duress.





Play #3: 1/10/35 - (2:04) T.Romo pass short left to D.Murray to MIA 48 for 17 yards (V.Davis) [C.Wake]. Pass complete on a "Wheel" route.

Here it is all about Romo being Romo. Pass protection is a mess here as the Dolphins run a double LB blitz from the QB's right side and Tyron Smith guesses wrong in his assignment. He ends up helping Kosier for no apparent reason and the flank is unguarded. This leaves John Phillips to try to block two blitzers, and he doesn't touch Cameron Wake on the outside. Trouble is, Karlos Dansby is blowing him up on the inside, too. Romo is dead here and actually decides to run from Wake to the left and somehow sees Murray out of the corner of his eye on the wheel route and a sure sack turns into a 17 yard gain. There is no way he should be able to make this pass after such a poor protection breakdown. Murray takes the pass in full gallop and gets into Miami territory. Sensational play by the QB.

Play #4: 1/10/48 - (1:41) D.Murray right guard to MIA 44 for 4 yards (K.Dansby).

A standard run/pass option that turns into a Fullback lead play with Phillips helping Murray shoot up for 4 yards on 1st Down. This is a play you will see from many different personnel groupings and formations about 5-6 times per game.

Play #5: 2/6/44 - (1:06) T.Romo pass short left to L.Robinson ran ob at MIA 30 for 14 yards. Pass complete on a "Square Out."

I wanted to point out this play to whatever remains from the "Jon Kitna should start faction". There was a time in the last 12 months where some well-meaning Cowboys fans actually thought Kitna should start in front of Tony Romo. I know they may be hard to identify right now, but trust me, they existed. Anyway, this, right here, is a throw Kitna cannot make. In fact, this, around draft time, is what they call "the NFL throw". It is an out from the far hash mark of his own 48-yard line to the 30-yard line of the Dolphins on a frozen rope to Laurent Robinson from the slot with a corner trying to undercut the route. If the pass doesn't get there, it is a Pick-6 the other way. Romo fires it and verifies his arm strength with ease. Not easy, but it looked easy and the Cowboys are now at the Dolphins 30 as the clock is running down in the 3rd Quarter.

Play #6: 1/10/30 - (1:06) (No huddle) Murray to left end to Mia 30 for no gain. (C.Clemons)

It looks like the Cowboys are hurrying to the line of scrimmage to get a snap off to insure there is no challenge on the pass to Robinson. It is simply a zone play to the left with Phillips in a lead FB spot. The Dolphins string out the play wide, and Murray has to fight to just get back to the 30. Not the smoothest looking run play of the day as Doug Free loses his fight at the point of attack. The Dolphins have DBs crashing hard and there is no gain to be found.

Play #7: 2/10/30 - (:11) Romo pass to short middle and Robinson to Miami 23 for 7 yards (C Clemons) Pass complete on a drag route.

The last play of the 3rd Quarter is a route that we were wondering about a month ago. Where had all of the shallow crosses gone in the Jason Garrett offense? It looks like Laurent Robinson is bringing them back. Still in "12", Tight Ends clear out the shallow linebackers, and now Robinson from the slot takes his man coverage across the middle. Just like the Bennett completion, this is all a matter of leading the man and giving him a chance at a big play, but again Clemons is sound on the tackling and it is just 7 yards.

4th Quarter

Play #8: 3/3/23 - (15:00) (Shotgun) T.Romo pass short middle to J.Witten to MIA 18 for 5 yards (M.Mitchell) [K.Dansby]. Pass complete on a "Crossing Pattern."

At the Quarter break, the Cowboys change personnel packages for the only time in the drive. They switch to "11" personnel and take off a TE in exchange for a WR. Kevin Ogletree and Witten both run shallow routes while Robinson and Bryant head down the field. Again, the Dolphins are in a man-under coverage with 3rd and short. This play is not that far from the play that broke Romo's collarbone against the Giants in 2010. Like that play, they have a check-release call on for the RB. Felix Jones checks for a blitzer and then releases into his route. But, like Chris Gronkowski last year, he didn't see and pick up the blitzer as Karlos Dansby comes free and tries to knock Romo out. Romo keeps his cool and delivers a duck as he is being hammered and Witten barely gets to it and moves the chain before taking down an unsuspecting cheerleader. Surely, this is not something you want to have happen much, but full marks to Romo for hanging in there and making a huge 3rd Down. This is a field goal drive if this play doesn't happen.



Play #9: 1/10/18 - (14:37) (Shotgun) T.Romo pass deep left corner of end zone to L Robinson for 18 yards and TOUCHDOWN. Pass complete on roll left for Romo.

Just a superb play, once again from "S11". Romo stays alive for 5.1 seconds with the ball as the protection is strong against a Dolphins 4 man rush. He then rolls to his left which obviously where he feels most comfortable these days (how many times have we seen it recently?) Robinson comes all the way across the field and Romo is feeling so good that he fires the ball over the head of Witten into the back of the end zone. Again, this requires a very strong arm and pin point accuracy. If the ball is not caught for a TD, then nobody is catching it. Simply phenomenal QB play on this play and the entire drive.

9 Plays - 73 yards - and the Cowboys took the lead again. They would need even another drive later to secure the win, but I just thought this was such a thing of beauty that we should take a harder look at it. Romo was on fire here as the ball never hit the turf.

"I'm not kidding you, that is one of the best drives a QB in the NFL will have this season" - Phil Simms

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Decoding Garrett - Week 9 - Data - Buffalo

Play calling is one of the more discussed and perhaps misunderstood elements of football. It seems that everyone who enjoys this game fancies themselves as learned play callers and yet just about every coordinator they follow never gets their job quite right. The only play callers that ever seem to get unanimous support are those that happen to have an offense under their command who wins all of the time. Generally, this also coincides with having superior talent and likely a wonderful QB.

Conversely, those who have inferior talent or a QB without experience are labeled as "poor" play callers. Whatever they tried on a given Sunday did not result in a victory, and therefore, to their fan base and media, they obviously called the wrong plays.

It is an exercise in insanity that often includes someone watching a spectacular TD catch by Dez Bryant and telling the person sitting nearby, "See, why don't they do that more often?" You know, call the touchdown play again. If only it were that easy.

Is Jason Garrett calling better plays now? Or, is a running game allowing easier passing attack opportunities? If there was no threat of a running game, would teams play more conservative defense and shade a safety over Dez Bryant? As you watch Green Bay dismantle Minnesota on Monday night football, you wonder if Mike McCarthy is the best play caller in football or does he have the best players? Or both?

In this space each Tuesday, we attempt to discuss the topic of play calling, deploying of the troops, and offensive execution. That includes an array of various items that can be looked at, and we attempt to tackle a different 1 or 2 each week. Then, we show data from that particular game to offer substantive results rather than simple opinions that have no evidence to confirm or deny the findings. Clearly, we are not NFL offensive minds that have resumes that may us candidates for future openings in the league, but by re-watching a game carefully, we can find a number of clues that tell us way more information about a football team than a guarded press conference ever can.

This week, we need to ponder whether the game against Buffalo was won during the week when the coaches sat down to discuss plans of attack. Much like the Eagles did to Dallas 2 weeks prior, the Bills suffered a 1st round knockout. When this happens, you can only look at each team's preparation and whatever the coaches decided on Tuesday in the film room was absolutely right in Dallas and absolutely wrong in Buffalo.

Let's look now at one example: The Cowboys very 1st Drive.

When Jason Garrett starts a game, he wants to get as many personnel groups out onto the field as possible. This practice is not uncommon around the league and generally the reason seems to be to collect photos and information in those first 10-15 plays. Of course, you want to score on those early drives, but you also want to see how the Bills have decided during their week of preparation how they are going to defend certain situations. Against "12" personnel, will they go nickel or dime? When Witten is flexed out as a receiver, will he receive bracket coverage or will they attempt to defend him with a safety straight up? Against "22", will the Bills put 8 or 9 in the box? These findings, often on pictures that are then studied between plays, are then applied for use later in the game. A scenario in the playbook that a coaching staff "wants to come back to" because they believe they have a plan for just that situation. Of course, they then hope that Buffalo doesn't change their strategies later in the game, too. This is the mental chess match that goes on during every game, but we seldom discuss or consider.

Dallas' 1st Drive of the afternoon included 5 plays. In order, they used "21", "22", "12", "S01", and "11" on the 5 plays to go 80 yards for the Touchdown. 5 different personnel groups and used a screen, a FB lead, then a short dump to Witten.

On 3rd and 4 from the 41, the Cowboys used "S01" which is empty backfield, 1 TE and 4 WRs. This puts Jesse Holley back into the mix and on to the field. He played exactly 1 pass play on Sunday and this was that moment. Off the snap, Laurent Robinson is to Holley's outside and runs a quick in route at the sticks. Meanwhile, Holley takes Terence McGee down the seams and McGee believes that Holley is going to stop in a shallow route. Once Holley keeps going, McGee is beaten in a trail position. I think it speaks volumes that Romo is willing to go to a player like Holley when he is never on the field, and he floats a ball where he needs Holley to go get it. When Holley gets his chance he leaps over McGee and helps move the chains with a large 26 yard gain for a 1st down.

The scoring moment in that 1st drive is another play of great beauty. 1st and 10 from the Bills 34, and the Cowboys use a grouping that they seldom go to. "11" personnel - but with Romo under center (11 personnel from the shotgun is what is called "Red Gun" or the Cowboys 3rd down and 2 minute drill package). "11" under center has only been used 13 times in 9 games. But, in this case, Witten is lined up as a fullback, and he will be asked with DeMarco Murray to stay in as a fortified protection ploy as the Cowboys wish to "take a shot" again on 1st down. We loved this concept last week as the Cowboys are now using the 50/50 1st Down for their most aggressive pass attempts because they know that with the new-found balance, the odds are much more in their favor to hit something big (rather than against a dime defense on 3rd Down where safeties lurk for interceptions).

The protection is needed as the Bills are sending a safety. This means that 3 Cowboys WRs will be working against 3 Bills corners and safety George Wilson up top. For Romo, it is a 7-step drop and he needs it all as the rush is closing in up the gut with Phil Costa losing his battle. 5 Bills against 7 Cowboys in pass protection means Romo can set and fire and when he sees Dez Bryant (on a stop and go pattern) against Leodis McKelvin in a 1-on-1 as Wilson cannot get there in time, his mind is made up. Romo sends the pass to the near pylon and Dez has to go over McKelvin to win the ball and save an interception. It was a fantastic play by Bryant and it shows that in this league a QB has to trust his WR to make a play because he is essentially throwing it right where the corner is waiting. But, Dez out leaps McKelvin and the Cowboys finish their 1st drive with a dazzling result.

5 personnel groups, 5 plays, 80 yards, and Romo is 4-4 for 76 yards. And you see how the preparation had the Bills tied up in knots before they even broke a sweat.

Another very interesting finding from our research on Sunday is that the "21" package was strong, but in a whole new way. "21" is what they call "regular" personnel in the Cowboys coaching offices. This is what the Cowboys ran under Norv Turner nearly all the time. Emmitt and Moose behind Aikman, Novacek at TE, and Michael Irvin with Alvin Harper out wide. A few weeks back, we talked about how Tony Fiammetta is helping to bring back "regular" personnel.

The numbers were exceptional. The Cowboys, who had no FB on the roster for several games to start the season, now employ Fiammetta as part of their attack on a routine basis. "21" is the neutral personnel group in the NFL, meaning that there is really not a heavy run package (like "22") and not a heavy pass package (like "11"). The defense has to play "21" straight up, or risk being burned.

For the 1st month with Fiammetta, the Cowboys killed teams with "21" personnel. 17 running plays for 235 yards means they were grabbing an insane 13.8 yards per attempt. Buffalo saw that and clearly purposed on stopping the run when they see "21" on Sunday. And they did. The Cowboys tried 13 run plays out of "21" on Sunday and only accumulated 37 yards. Buffalo wanted to plug up the run on Fiammetta and did a nice job on this personnel grouping. But, at what cost? Well, the Cowboys also threw the ball out of "21" 8 times. On those 8 throws, they found 110 yards - including the 58-yard bomb to Robinson off play action in "21" personnel. The Bills were sitting on the run with Fiammetta and they were burned badly. This is the beauty of balance in your offense. Pick your poison.

Data from Week 9

Shotgun snaps are fine on 3rd Down and in the 2 minute drill. But, we track this stat from week to week to make sure the Cowboys aren't getting too lazy in using it. They are not efficient enough to run it as their base, and with a 15%/85% run/pass split, there is no way the defense respects your running game.

Against the Bills, the Cowboys avoided shotgun because they were in control of the lead. The better you run the ball, the less you depend on Romo in the shotgun against nickel and dime coverages. In other words, the more you have offensive success.

SHOTGUN SNAPS-

Wk 1 - NYJ: 24/66

Wk 2 - SF: 32/66

Wk 3 - Wash: 27/62

Wk 4 - Det: 29/75

Wk 5 - NE 31/67

Wk 6 - StL 10/60

Wk 7 - Phi 39/49

Wk 8 - Sea 19/59

Wk 9 - Buf 15/61


Total - 226/564 40.1%

=====


Here is the Game Data from Week 9:

Big development here. The Cowboys owned 3rd Downs. Romo was dead on and the team saw a conversion rate they seldom see. 8-12 is 67% and a rare awesome week in this category.

Run-Pass	35-26
1st Down Run-Pass	20-10
2nd Down Avg Distance to Go	7.63
2nd Down Run-Pass	12-7
3rd Down Avg Distance to Go	6.00
3rd Down Run-Pass	3-9
3rd Down Conversions	8-12, 67%

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Drive Starters - 1st play of each drive can often reveal the intent of a coach to establish his game plan. Heavy run and then when you least suspect it, a max-protect throw up top.

Wk 1-At New York Jets: 13 Drives - 5 Run/8 Pass

Wk 2-At San Francisco: 10 Drives - 4 Run/6 Pass

Wk 3-Washington: 11 Drives - 5 Run/6 Pass

Wk 4-Detroit: 14 Drives - 7 Run/7 Pass

Wk 5-At New England: 11 Drives - 4 Run/7 Pass

Wk 6-St Louis: 11 Drives - 8 Run/3 Pass

Wk 7-At Philadelphia - 9 Drives - 2 Run/7 Pass

Wk 8-Seattle - 11 Drives - 4 Run/7 Pass

Wk 9-Buffalo - 10 Drives - 7 Run/3 Pass

Total: 100 Drives - 46 Run/54 Pass 46% Run


Here is the breakdown by groupings:

Before you study the data below, I would recommend that if the numbers for the groupings are unfamiliar, that you spend some time reading a more expanded definition of the Personnel Groupings here.

Again, look at the production from under center. And see that the easiest time to throw for an offense is when the defense is sitting run. This is as balanced an offense as we have seen since 2008 when their September performance was a beauty to behold.

Totals by Personnel Groups:

Package	Plays Run	Yards	Run	Pass
11	2	47	1-13	1-34
12	7	41	4-24	3-17
13	0	0	0-0	0-0
21	21	147	13-37	8-110
22	13	90	11-79	2-11
23	0	0	0-0	0-0
S01	1	26	0-0	1-26
S02	2	4	0-0	2-4
S11	10	85	3-15	7-70
S12	2	-1	0-0	2--1
Knee	3	-3	3--3	0-0
Totals	61	168	35-168	26-271

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And now those same numbers on 3rd and 4th Downs. It is clear here that Romo was seeing the game and feeling the coverages with great ease. Dallas can only hope there is more of this coming now that he appears healthy again.

Totals by Personnel Groups on 3rd/4th Down:

Package	Plays	Yards	Run	Pass	FD/TD
11	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
12	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
21	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
22	1	1	1-1	0-0	1/0
23	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
S01	1	26	0-0	1-26	1/0
S02	1	4	0-0	1-4	0/1
S11	9	82	2-12	7-70	5/0
S12	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
Totals	12	113	3-13	9-100	7/1

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Overall, this was another successful offensive day. Even the goal-line offense was great. If they can find this performance on a regular basis, they will surely be in the playoffs. Trouble has been playing on the road. Will Romo and Garrett "let it rip" when they go on the road? Sunday will tell us plenty when they head to Washington.

Tomorrow, for our Xs and Os breakdown, we will examine the blitz scheme Rob Ryan threw at the Bills with such success.

And please email me at Sturm1310@aol.com if you have questions that I may clarify in an upcoming email blog.

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The Morning After: Cowboys 44, Bills 7 (5-4)

Something very important has happened with the Cowboys over the last few weeks.

No. The important occurrence was not the 44-7 thumping of Buffalo and a rather underwhelming, but commanding win over Seattle. Although, those wins were both imperative and necessary and have the Cowboys off to a nice start in this stretch where they would play 5 very beatable opponents and would need to go 5-0 to have a chance at the NFC East entering the final stretch in December.

No. The important occurrence was not the continuing breakout and dominance of rookie RB DeMarco Murray. Although his 4-game stretch in games that he has started since Felix Jones went down in New England is easily the best yardage total of any 4-game stretch of any Cowboys Running Back EVER. Murray has 601 yards in 4 starts, and as a reference point, Emmitt Smith's biggest 4-game yardage pile is 550 yards from 1993. Nobody is saying that Murray is Emmitt, but, um, we must be saying he is pretty good.

No. The important occurrence was not Tony Romo finally resembling the QB that he has been since 2006 with a nearly perfect passing performance against the Bills. Only Peyton Manning and Tony Romo have a streak of the last 5-straight years of over a 90 passer rating. He is sure to make it 6 in a row, it would seem, now that he has bounced back from his broken rib/punctured lung episodes from Week 2 and finally looks the part of a QB who is in charge of his offense.

And, No. The important occurrence was also not the defense suddenly making opposing QBs look helpless against various blitz concepts. Although it was sure pleasant to see some invention and execution meet on the field after the debacle in Philadelphia where Rob Ryan's bravado seemed to lack a whole lot of substance when his poking-with-a-sharp-stick routine fizzled on Sunday Night 15 days ago. Now, the blind-side hits on unsuspecting QBs are adding up and so are the takeaways. That is a very key development as well, but not the most vital.

The very important occurrence that has happened for the Dallas Cowboys 2011 campaign might have taken place in a meeting room in Valley Ranch or perhaps on the team chartered airplane as it flew quietly from Philadelphia back to Dallas. Wherever it happened doesn't matter. But it happened. Jason Garrett decided to challenge and trust his offensive line and return to attacking offense. And when that happened, the Cowboys offense received a facelift that it needed terribly.

Anyone who watches the Cowboys on a week to week basis with a very careful eye will see that the Cowboys problems are not nearly as delicious as people want you to believe on the national pre-game shows. While they argue that Jason Garrett doesn't trust his QB Tony Romo to make smart throws at big moments, the reality was right in front of everyone's face. The head coach would love to be put in a spot where he had to trust his QB again. But, the issue never got that far as he stopped believing in his offensive line, one could argue, in the Metrodome back in the 2009 playoffs when Ray Edwards tossed Marc Colombo around the dome while Doug Free and Jason Witten were trying to handle Jared Allen. Then, in the middle, the Cowboys had their hands full with the "Williams Wall" and Romo was running for his life. As for the running game that day, well, there wasn't one. Romo was sacked 6 times and the Cowboys were spanked 34-3, leaving a bad taste in the mouth of those were were feeling pretty good about the 2009 season to that point.

From there came a 2010 season where the Cowboys started the year with Jason Garrett allowing the offensive line to prove itself. Within a month, the line was caving in on all running plays (who can forget the way Tennessee destroyed the Cowboys' front all day) and Romo was under pressure constantly. Leonard Davis and Colombo looked like they were done and the Cowboys had nobody behind them that they were willing to put on the field. New left tackle Free was being given help on nearly every occasion as Dallas was wisely making sure he was ready for primetime. They left the training wheels on Free through another trip to the Metrodome last season in Week 5 as the Cowboys threw 22 of 32 passes at or behind the line of scrimmage. They threw the ball because they had to, but the passes were all short and quick because they did not want to see if the OL could hold up. It was arguably the least aggressive game plan of Garrett's career and the Cowboys lost late without ever really throwing their best punch for fear that the punch might expose them to a counter they couldn't handle. It was textbook careful coaching.

The next week, the Cowboys saw why Garrett was so scared of his offensive line. Tony Romo was decked because of a faulty blitz pick-up and broke his collarbone. He was gone for the season and whatever remained of the Cowboys season and the Wade Phillips coaching regime was discarded that evening. The last two games Wade likely ever coached as a head coach in the NFL were two of the most embarrassing displays in Cowboys history as they were laughed at in front of their home fans by the Jacksonville Jaguars - a team that seldom laughs at anyone. Wade was put out of his misery in Green Bay in early November, 2010, as Clay Matthews and Dom Capers put a clinic of blitzes on a Cowboys offense that looked like they couldn't wait for the season to end.

In the offseason before 2011, the Cowboys knew they needed to gut their offensive line. They knew if they were ever compete again at a high level again, it would not be with Davis, Colombo, and even center Andre Gurode still holding down unchallenged spots on the offensive line that was no longer capable of even being called average. Their performance handicapped the offensive play calling and while fans wanted Romo and Garrett's heads on platters, the truth was that they were both doomed because of protection and blocking issues every single Sunday. Garrett's only advantage was that he did not suffer physical pain from the OL's lack of performance. Romo was the man who had to wear a sling because of it.

They bid those 3 highly-compensated veterans a farewell, and replaced them with kids. Tyron Smith was highly regarded and promising for any team in the NFL. Phil Costa and Bill Nagy were unregarded and Dallas was really gambling that they were right while the rest of the league missed on two young jewels who were ready for primetime. Change is good. But, change without proper replacements is reckless. It was most curious that the Cowboys seemed so sure of themselves and even talked about their new love for "zone blocking" and smallish type fighters in the trenches that surely did not agree with Hudson Houck's career resume of road-graders and pulling guards.

In the first 5 games, it was different but not better. The interior of the line was very bad. The running game was not going anywhere and the passing game was not stretching anyone. 3 and 5 step drops as Romo was trying to get rid of the ball quickly to save his body from another cast or sling. Garrett was not calling games to attack, he was calling games to just stay alive and hope for a play late. He was playing the cards he was dealt.

Something happened in New England as the Cowboys played another protective, conservative offensive game. Bill Nagy was hurt - forcing the Cowboys to bring back Montrae Holland. Felix Jones was hurt which forced DeMarco Murray into the group. Tony Fiammetta recovered from his injuries giving the Cowboys a true fullback. The zone running was almost completely scrapped for the familiar G-power and larger man blocking that the Cowboys know. Suddenly, the running game returned against the Rams. It gave the defense something to consider and opened up a little more space. At the same time, Romo was healing and returning to a QB who didn't look spooked.

Then, the massacre in Philadelphia hit, and that is when the details get fuzzy about Garrett's thinking. He hides his cards very well and talks for 30 minutes without saying much at his media press briefings. But, his actions speak loudly.

And upon the team's return to Arlington for Seattle and Buffalo, we are seeing the results of his actions. The offensive line has been granted a helping of belief from the play-caller and the Quarterback. They are being asked to block and protect. This allows the running game to feed the passing game and vice versa. And when that happens, things open up. Safeties creep up and get burned over the top. This is possible because the QB and play caller are willing to risk a 7-step drop and believe in pass protection again that is required for deep passes. Blocks are opened and swagger returns. And suddenly, we see that the Cowboys offense, for the first time in nearly 2 years, is back to attacking.

Is Phil Costa ready? No. Is Kyle Kosier healthy? Doesn't seem so. Is Holland any better than he has always been? Probably not. But, the group has a coach that has decided to put some responsibility back on their shoulders. That is easier at home against Buffalo than it is in Philadelphia or New York, but it is a welcome start. As they continue to show that they can be counted upon, I believe Garrett and Romo will continue to feed more their way.

The offensive line is proving it can carry some weight again and that is the story here. That certainly won't entertain a national audience like a Romo/Dez/Garrett/Jerry debate, but sometimes the truth doesn't attract ratings like fabrications.

All that matters from the Cowboys perspective is that they are back on the attack. Let's see if it continues in Washington.

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X's And O's Breakdown - 36 Inches to Paydirt

December 2009. Week 13. Critical matchup at home against San Diego for the Cowboys. Down 10-3, the Cowboys have marched from their own 27-yard line all the way down the field in 12 plays. 11 of the 12 plays were runs, and the 12th play was an incomplete pass. They have driven the entire field without ever completing a pass. This is a real show of strength against one of the best defensive fronts in football.

1 yard to go. 2nd and goal from the 1 yard line. Dive play where Marion Barber, behind FB Deon Anderson, is stopped just short of the goal-line. 3rd and goal, another Barber dive is again stopped just short. 4th and goal. "23" personnel for the 3rd straight play. This time, Felix Jones is deep and Marion Barber is lined up as the fullback. The Cowboys give again to Barber and the 4th down play is the worst of them all. 3 cracks from the 1 fail, and the Cowboys lose 20-17.



A topic that has been discussed at great length in just about every circle of the Cowboys' kingdom this week has been red zone problems. There is no doubt that the inefficiency of this offense can be traced on some level to the inability of the team to produce as many points as their yardage indicates they are earning.

Countless coaches - including Bill Parcells who hammered this point home in many Cowboys' press briefings - would tell us that a football team needs to get 7 points for every 100 yards of offense in a given game. Anything less would draw our attention to the efficiency of the offense. Yards are yards, until you get to the 1-yard line. Then you need that yard. And the Cowboys have constantly failed there in recent seasons.

Since the start of the 2009 season, the Cowboys have had 40 plays from the 1-yard line. 36 inches from a touchdown, many times with the outcome of the game hanging in the balance. On only 13 occasions were the Cowboys able to punch it in for a Touchdown. 13 of 40 is an absurdly low success rate of 32% when a team has to only make 3 feet or less to break the plane of the goal-line.

Passing the ball for the Touchdown has become the route to success on most occasions - although to be fair, neither has been converting at a high enough level.. Normally from play action from a heavy personnel set, the Cowboys have converted 7 Touchdowns on 17 pass attempts (41%) for scores from the 1 since 2009. This, of course, means that amazingly, just 6 of 23 run attempts (26%) have been punched in from the 1-yard line. That success rate is almost comically bad.

So, after the deflating sequence in the Seattle game where Dallas had 3 cracks at the 1 and failed to find the endzone. It is maddening and sends many to their keyboards to voice another dissertation about how Jason Garrett lacks imagination and the ability to lead this Dallas squad any further. But, I think it goes back to that issue that has been haunting the Cowboys for a long, long time: No faith in their offensive line. And after switching out the members of the offensive line, it appears that their power down by the goal-line is still just a dream rather than a reality.

Since the start of 2010, there have been 31 snaps from the 1 yard line. During that stretch, the Cowboys have scored just 11 Touchdowns in 31 attempts from the 1 (35%).

Below, you will see the "23" package, which has been used in 20 of the last 31 snaps from the 1 yard line by Jason Garrett. 7 of the 20 plays resulted in Touchdowns (3 run TDs, 4 pass TDs). "23" is the biggest personnel group in the arsenal. 3 TEs, a FB, and a RB. It amounts to 8 OL-types and a lead blocker to help get the RB just 1 yard. And it has not done the job. 35% success rate.



The following is a chart that shows the 31 snaps from the 1-yard line since Week 1 2010 for the Cowboys offense:

Package	Plays Run	TDs	Run	Pass
13	1	1	1-1 TD	0-0
21	1	0	1-0	0-0
22	4	0	2-0	2-0
23	21	7	11-3 TDs	10-4 TDs
S11	4	3	1-1 TD	3-2 TDs
Totals	31	11	16-5 TDs	15-6 TDs

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I think the chart shows something that may seem counter-intuititve to those of us who value power football. The Cowboys, at least in this sample size, are not capable of showing any strength for that last important yard; especially in "power" formations that feature multiple TEs and FBs.

And, the evidence does concede that Barber was the best choice in these running situations. Marion Barber was the best at 5-12 from the 1-yard line on run plays, but the Cowboys weren't going to keep a RB for strictly short yardage at his salary. Tashard Choice was 1-6 and the only other runner to get a crack before 2011 in this study. This season, Felix Jones is 1-2 and DeMarco Murray is 0-1.

But, this research project does appear to give us one nugget of goodness. 4 times in 2010, the team lined up in S11 and they scored TDs on 3 of the 4 occasions. Could you imagine the outrage if they get to the 1 and then try to run the shotgun offense out there and fail? I admit that I would lead that charge before I did the research. But, now, seeing how poorly this team is able to get that most important yard on the field, I am tempted to make sure Jason Garrett reads this study and considers the findings. They are two-fold: 1) using traditional means, what they are trying is not working. Not even close. And 2) albeit with a small sample size (4 tries), the Cowboys are best at spreading the defense out and either passing or running out of shotgun. Shotgun TDs from the 1 against Jacksonville, Detroit, and Philadelphia in 2010 seem to at least give us something to consider. Only 1 failure (Washington in Week 14) can be found in the data. 3 out of 4 is impressive. 8 out of 27 with all other formations is not.

2011 Season

Now, here is the chart for 2011 only. In the first 8 games, there have been 9 occasions for a snap at the opponent's 1 yard line. So far, they are 4 out of 9 from the 1 yard line. But, I still think we are not seeing much improvement.

Package	Plays Run	TDs	Run	Pass
13	1	1	1-1 TD	0-0
23	8	3	2-0	6-3 TDs
Totals	9	4	3-1 TD	6-3 TDs

Table Tutorial

Let's look at each of the nine plays. I have made a reel of all 9 snaps on video for you to look at as we go. You can see them all by clicking on this link.

1. Week 1 at Jets - Play #47 - 1/G/1 - "23" - Following a review that ruled Sean Lee's interception was out at the 1, the Cowboys run "23" without a FB on the roster. Enter Josh Brent as the new short yardage FB. Martin Rucker and John Phillips at TE on the left, Witten on the right. Play Action fake to Jones for the dive and only Witten is in the route. LB David Harris stays with Romo so there is no other option. Romo throws the ball out of the end-zone because it is 1st Down. INCOMPLETE

2. Week 1 at Jets - Play #48 - 2/G/1 - "13" - On this play, the Cowboys have Miles Austin outside Rucker on the right. This weapon keeps the Jets' DBs honest and Revis sets up over Austin. Rucker off RT and Witten off LT. Phillips lines up at FB. Now, the stretch play to the left with the zone blocking technique up front. Jones takes the handoff and 70-Mike Devito shoves LG Bill Nagy back. However, the play goes wide enough that Felix follows a convoy of Doug Free, Witten, and Phillips into the end zone. This is the one and only rushing TD in 9 plays from the 1 in 2011. TOUCHDOWN

3. Week 4 vs Lions - Play #18 - 4/G/1 - "23" - This may be the play that has spooked the Cowboys and their fans the most. The Cowboys showed a lot of courage - or stupidity - on this play as they attempted to ram the ball right into the jaws of the stout Detroit defensive front. And not only the front, but right at RT and rookie Tyron Smith who was attempting to block Ndamukong Suh and to give FB Josh Brent a chance to dig out the LB for Felix Jones. Everyone blocks straight up and Brent is supposed to clear a gap. But, Smith gets defeated soundly by Suh and turned, so Brent decides to help out on Suh. By this point, Will LB Ashlee Palmer is there to close down Jones and Corey Williams arrives to further doom the play. It looks like Jones runs into Brent and the play is over - as is the possession. TURNOVER ON DOWNS

4. Week 4 vs Lions - Play #44 - 1/G/1 - "23" - After Kevin Ogletree's reception is ruled by replay to be down at the 1, the Cowboys have another scenario on the goal-line against Detroit. This time, perhaps their run earlier in the game (above) was in the head of the Detroit LBs, because 55-Tulloch runs right by Jason Witten to bite on the play fake. This time, Kosier is defeated at the line, but the play fake puts Phillips and Witten in route. Since nobody covers Witten, this is an easy TD for Romo to hit on what appeared to be a route of Detroit at the time. TOUCHDOWN

5. Week 5 at Patriots - Play #35 - 2/G/1 - "23" - Right before the half in Foxboro, the Cowboys are faced with 2nd and Goal. Here, they try Witten and Bennett on the right of Smith and Phillips on the left. The play calls for a play fake right with Witten dragging across the OL to the left. The play is almost doomed because of all of the chaos on the line of scrimmage as Smith is being tossed back at the snap by Vince Wilfork. Witten, Smith, and Josh Brent almost all collide, but Witten jumps through and navigates to the flat where he is found by Romo and just crosses the goal-line. A tricky play that is executed, but perhaps demonstrates to the coaches that again that this offensive line cannot win a goal-line pushing match against a solid front. TOUCHDOWN

6. Week 6 vs Rams - Play #13 - 3/G/1 - "23" - This is the first scenario with a FB - Tony Fiammetta and DeMarco Murray at RB. As you can see on the replay, it is alarming how nobody even considers the run fake on the Rams' defense. But, it appears MLB James Laurinaitis is out to lunch and this leaves 27-Quintin Mikell in the very unenviable position of trying to cover 2 men in the end zone. Fiammetta is shallow across the line and Witten goes deep. With only 1 defender, Romo waits for Mikell to choose and throws the other way. Again, the Cowboys are happy to accept a blown assignment for a score. TOUCHDOWN

7. Week 8 vs Seahawks - Play #22 - 1/G/1 - "23" - Here is the first real QB mistake that we see in this study. On this play, it seems rather clear that John Phillips is open for a large amount of time (by goal-line standards) as all Seattle LBs bit on the fake. Notice Montrae Holland pulling out to LT to help pass protect as well. Romo is locked on Witten here and it costs him an easy Touchdown to Phillips. Seattle is not going to let Witten out of their sight and Fiammetta is covered in the flat. After leaving Witten, he decides to fire it out of the back of the end zone and move to 2nd Down. That is a good decision, but a missed chance. INCOMPLETE

8. Week 8 vs Seahawks - Play #23 - 2/G/1 - "23" - This is a play that we have seen the Cowboys get away with a number of times under Garrett. This is not one of them. It is a power run to the right side - complete with the rare pulling guard on the goal-line and then as the entire play is going right, Romo pitches it to the weakside for the RB to run on his own to the left pylon. The idea is that the LBs will read the guard and all follow their reads. Instead, the play doesn't go as planned. Costa is blown up in the middle, but the play is designed for Murray to beat the unblocked DE (91-Cleamons) to the corner. It appears on the replay that Murray could still get to the corner and that Free and Witten have blocked the play properly. It is complete speculation, but I am curious if the offensive coaches feel this play could have worked if Murray did not cut back and just try to win the footrace to the corner. 0 YARD GAIN

9. Week 8 vs Seahawks - Play #24 - 3/G/1 - "23" - Now, the 3rd crack from the 1, and Garrett is not about to try another run. I really wonder not trying a simple power lead here as Fiammetta, Holland, and Murray were all added since the Detroit game, and frankly the running game looks 100% improved. To get 3 cracks from the 1 and just to run 2 passes and a trick run is easy to 2nd guess. But, Garrett wanted play action and the Seahawks blitzed a safety from over Witten's shoulder on the right. Then, their coverage of Murray and Witten quickly left Romo in a jam. He did well to avoid a sack, but the play was doomed. INCOMPLETE

There they are. 4 TDs in 9 attempts, but only 1 Rushing TD and almost a reluctance to even try a straight-up run.

Which leads me back to the idea of spreading out the defense and loosening up the middle. A shotgun run or even a QB draw would be an option, as would a number of pass routes. If the Cowboys were any good out of power sets, they should stay with them, but it seems their only success has been to Witten - and now the defense has been studying these scenarios and seem to be sitting on Romo's favorite target.

It would seem the evidence that ranges back 3 season indicates that a power run is something the coaches do not believe is possible. It seems silly to use that power run as the basis from a play action fake any longer.

Now that the NFL reviews all scoring plays in 2011, an opposing coach no longer has to choose whether or not to burn a challenge on a play that is either a TD or 1st and Goal at the 1-foot line. But, when playing the Cowboys, you can understand the league-wide reluctance to concede a TD rather than making Dallas prove they can punch it in.

They obviously really struggle to do so. 13 of 40 is a 3-year trend that must be fixed.

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Decoding Garrett - Week 8 - Data - Seattle

"Winning 1st Down". The basic battle ground of a football game starts for all involved on winning 1st Down. Anyone who consumes NFL press conferences will often hear a coach talk about this topic and often not quite understand the ramifications of what it all means. After all, as a fan, 1st Down hardly ever seems vital in its outcome. This is where coaches and fans see things quite differently.

1st and 10 is the ultimate 50/50 split play. The defensive team must sit on the years and years of data at nearly all levels of football that say on 1st and 10 tendencies do not reveal anything. 50% of their positioning, strategy, and technique is to defend against the run and 50% is to prepare for the pass. A defense must play it "straight up" because the offense is looking to take advantage of as coaches say, "whatever the defense gives them".

Meanwhile, offensive coaches are talking about "staying on schedule". This means that they prefer to always remain in the 50/50 scenario inside the defense's head. What does this mean? Well, if 1st and 10 is 50/50, so is 2nd and 6 or less. 2nd and 12 or 2nd and 9 is a pass-heavy down. And on 3rd Down, the entire league passes, but if the team is to stay where it is 50/50, you would need 3rd and short. Let's say 3rd and less than 3.

If you get behind schedule, now the defense is not concerned with your run attack. And if they can eliminate run plays from their focus, then this is where you get coverage issues and blitz situations. And this is where nearly every offense finds operating more difficult.

So, if you can weed through the cliches and the armor of Jason Garrett when he talks offense, you will find a guy who believes in offensive balance and staying on schedule (as does pretty much every coach this side of Mike Leach). This is certainly now a pass-first league with offenses just running 42% and passing 58%, but 1st Down remains what it always has. 50/50, or 50.7% run and 49.3% pass so far league-wide in 2011 to be precise.

Which brings us to the Dallas Cowboys. The Cowboys have run 250 snaps out on 1st Down this year and run the ball 50.8% of the time (127/123). When they move to 2nd Down, the splits are now 71/103 (41% run). And of course on 3rd Down, it drops off the table to 17/79 or 17% runs. Defenses collect this data and it helps them determine what sub-packages to utilize in a given down and distance situation. Of course, offenses use the same charts to determine ideal plays for ideal Down and Distance opportunities as well. Every coach has plenty of plays for 3rd and 3, but they will all tell you there is no play for 3rd and 16,

In effect, everything you do as an offense starts on 1st and 10. And that is why we keep the numbers that we do in the first box every week. We want to see the Run/Pass splits according to down, and more importantly, we want to see how many yards to go the Cowboys were asking of themselves on 2nd and 3rd Down. This team is having major issues this season on 3rd Downs (35%) and most of those issues happen when they get in too many "3rd and Long" spots. The entire NFL converts just 19% on 3rd and 10+, and the Cowboys are even worse at 17%.

RESULTS VS SEATTLE

Why am I writing all of this after the offense played so well against Seattle until it fell into the red zone? Because, the Cowboys were quite successful on 1st Down in this game, and everything else fell into place. The important statistic known as "average yards to go on 2nd Down" produced the best result of the season (6.33). Across the NFL, teams average 7.97 yards to go on 2nd Down. The Cowboys mark is slightly better at 7.89. So, the mark of 6.33 is very strong. This means they were getting plenty of good things done on 1st Down. The running game was strong and that made the Seahawks bring a safety up to help defend against DeMarco Murray. When they walk a safety up, that is when Romo is ready to go to the air on 1st Down.

Fans will tell you this is Garrett finally realizing that he should throw the ball down the field. Garrett will tell you that this doesn't happen if the Seahawks don't fear the running game and commit a safety up in the box. And, the Seahawks don't fear the run if there is nothing to fear.

4 times on Sunday, Garrett and Romo "took a shot" down the field. I imagine this is a season high for deep routes, but I my memory could be failing. The Witten busted coverage TD is not included here as that was a developing pass play that was simply Romo going through his reads. But, the 4 shots below were all designed as the 1st and sometimes only option of the pass play down the field.

Deep Shot #1 - Play #7 - 1/10/D30 - 21 Personnel - 39 yards to Bryant
Deep Shot #2 - Play #19 - 3/4/D32 - S12 Personnel - 37 yards to Austin
Deep Shot #3 - Play #41 - 1/10/D31 - 12 Personnel - INC down sideline to Austin
Deep Shot #4 - Play #50a - 1/10/O35 - 21 Personnel - INC down sideline to Robinson

Notice, 3 are on 1st and 10 when the defense is looking for the 50/50 run possibilities. 2 are with Tony Fiammetta back there as a fullback, thus getting the strong safety's attention. In fact, on the first shot - the completion to Bryant in the 1st Quarter, Earl Thomas is blitzing and Fiammetta picks him up.



The image above shows Thomas sneaking up to the 35 yard line as the 8th man in the box. They are ready to take on the run. And that leaves Bryant and Austin in a man-to-man situation with a free safety over the top. And when there is a single-high safety, he cannot protect the sideline route. It is simply too much ground to cover.

So, does this pass happen if they are in a 2-Deep situation as in the week before at Philadelphia? No. The pass is not there. The threat of the run is what makes this play possible.

The same is true on the other two 1st Down passes down the field. Hold the safeties and take a shot. This isn't to say that deep throws can never happen without a running game making the opponent respect you, but it does demonstrate that things get so much easier if you can run the football.

1st Down shots to your Wide Receivers down the field. Is there enough time to pass protect? If you do it on 1st Down, there will be much more. And, the final two "shots" were both the drive starters. After interceptions, Garrett/Romo went for the throat on 1st and 10. Look for this as the season continues to develop.

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Data from Week 8

Shotgun snaps are fine on 3rd Down and in the 2 minute drill. But, we track this stat from week to week to make sure the Cowboys aren't getting too lazy in using it. They are not efficient enough to run it as their base, and with a 15%/85% run/pass split, there is no way the defense respects your running game.

SHOTGUN SNAPS-

Wk 1 - NYJ: 24/66

Wk 2 - SF: 32/66

Wk 3 - Wash: 27/62

Wk 4 - Det: 29/75

Wk 5 - NE 31/67

Wk 6 - StL 10/60

Wk 7 - Phi 39/49

Wk 8 - Sea 19/59

Total - 211/503 41.9%

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Here is the Game Data from Week 8:

Look at the great stats on 2nd and 3rd down yardage to go. You will take that every week and you will win.

Run-Pass	28-31
1st Down Run-Pass	12-14
2nd Down Avg Distance to Go	6.33
2nd Down Run-Pass	14-6
3rd Down Avg Distance to Go	5.14
3rd Down Run-Pass	3-11
3rd Down Conversions	6-14, 43%

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Drive Starters - 1st play of each drive can often reveal the intent of a coach to establish his game plan. On Sunday, The Cowboys had a surprising number of 1st play passes. In fact, some were downfield. A very aggressive game plan from the coach.

Wk 1-At New York Jets: 13 Drives - 5 Run/8 Pass

Wk 2-At San Francisco: 10 Drives - 4 Run/6 Pass

Wk 3-Washington: 11 Drives - 5 Run/6 Pass

Wk 4-Detroit: 14 Drives - 7 Run/7 Pass

Wk 5-At New England: 11 Drives - 4 Run/7 Pass

Wk 6-St Louis: 11 Drives - 8 Run/3 Pass

Wk 7-At Philadelphia - 9 Drives - 2 Run/7 Pass

Wk 8-Seattle - 11 Drives - 4 Run/7 Pass

Total: 90 Drives - 39 Run/51 Pass 43% Run


Here is the breakdown by groupings:

Before you study the data below, I would recommend that if the numbers for the groupings are unfamiliar, that you spend some time reading a more expanded definition of the Personnel Groupings here.

Here we look at how the Cowboys did with each personnel package. Once again we see that packages that involve FB Fiammetta are far more efficient than the packages that don't. He, of course, is the lead blocker in "21" and "22". And the 79 run plays from 21 and 22 this season have yielded 628 yards or 7.94 yards per carry. However, in "11", "12", and "13" personnel (no FB or a TE lined up as a FB) the Cowboys have tried 90 run plays this season for just 243 yards - 2.7 yards per carry. That sample should also account for Murray in place of Felix on most carries, but that is a startling number.

Totals by Personnel Groups:

Package	Plays Run	Yards	Run	Pass
11	1	2	1-2	0-0
12	6	58	1-2	5-56
13	1	8	0-0	1-8
21	9	78	6-70	3-8
22	20	130	18-113	2-17
23	3	0	1-0	2-0
S01	1	6	0-0	1-6
S02	4	52	0-0	4-52
S11	10	66	0-0	10-66
S12	4	42	1-4	3-38
Knee	1	0	0-0	0-0
Totals	59	442	28-191	31-251

Table Tutorial

And now those same numbers on 3rd and 4th Downs. Efficiency here needs to be a focus point in the 2nd half. The elite offenses are out performing the Cowboys by a shocking advantage.

Totals by Personnel Groups on 3rd/4th Down:

Package	Plays	Yards	Run	Pass	FD/TD
11	1	2	1-2	0-0	0/0
12	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
21	0	0	0-0	0-0	0/0
22	1	14	1-14	0-0	1/0
23	1	0	0-0	1-0	0/0
S01	1	6	0-0	1-6	0/1
S02	3	46	0-0	3-46	1/0
S11	5	30	0-0	5-30	2/0
S12	2	41	1-4	1-37	1/0
Totals	14	139	3-20	11-119	5/1

Table Tutorial

All in all, a very strong offensive game where they were sabotaged by the offense for quite a while.

Tomorrow, let's break down the issues with the goal-line offense in our X's and O's breakdown. And please email me at Sturm1310@aol.com if you have questions that I may clarify in an upcoming email blog.

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